Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Works of Love', 'The Logic of What Might Have Been' and 'The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston)'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
22864 Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
22873 Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
22869 Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22867 The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
22870 No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
22866 Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
15998 Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
22872 Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
22880 The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22879 'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
22877 We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
22878 Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]