22 ideas
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |