33 ideas
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |