15 ideas
21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |