Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Logic for Philosophy' and 'Truthmakers'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

66 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
13689 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
13705 Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
13706 Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider]
13710 In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
13711 System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
13708 S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
13712 Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
13714 We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
13720 Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider]
13718 The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider]
13723 System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
13715 You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13678 The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider]
13679 Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider]
13682 Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider]
13680 Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
13722 A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
13696 When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
13700 A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
13703 λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
13688 Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider]
13687 No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
13690 Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider]
13691 Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
13685 Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
13686 We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
13697 Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
13684 The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider]
13704 It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13724 In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
13698 In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
13699 Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
13701 A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
13692 A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
13695 Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
13693 A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
13694 We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13683 A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13702 The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
13721 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
13707 Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
13709 Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
13716 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13717 Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
13719 Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22086 The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]