Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford' and 'Knowledge First (and reply)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


15 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]