12 ideas
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |