Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Persistence, Change and Explanation', 'works' and 'On the Soul (frags)'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]