72 ideas
| 15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
| 15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
| 13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
| 15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
| 15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
| 15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
| 15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
| 15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
| 15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
| 15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
| 15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
| 12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
| 13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
| 13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
| 13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
| 13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
| 12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
| 15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
| 15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
| 15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
| 15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
| 13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
| 13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
| 15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
| 15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
| 15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
| 15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
| 15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
| 15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
| 15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |