14 ideas
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| 17366 | Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha] |