Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language', 'Letter to Shumacher' and 'First Things First'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

11 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite

10855

Actual infinities are not allowed in mathematics - only limits which may increase without bound [Gauss]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

19520

Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

19521

If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]

19522

More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]

19523

Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following

19271

No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]

19269

'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings

7305	Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]

19270

If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

11076

Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]

19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language

11075

The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]