11 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |