7 ideas
14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |