19 ideas
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |