Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
7096 We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
7098 There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
7099 With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
7100 Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
7102 Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
7095 Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7094 Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
7093 Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
7104 The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7103 Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]