25 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |