20 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |