Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Necessity and Non-Existence' and 'Thought'

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46 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3099 Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
3077 Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3092 If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3093 Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
3098 Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
3094 You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
3084 Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
3080 Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
3081 A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
3100 You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
3089 Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
3088 Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3101 Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
3074 People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
3096 Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3095 Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
3073 We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3076 Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
3075 Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3086 Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
3078 Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
3090 There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
3082 Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
3079 Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
3085 Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
3087 The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3083 Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]