16 ideas
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |