12 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
14380 | The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |