Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language', 'Essentialists and Essentialism' and 'Counterparts and Identity'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula

18823

To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

14380

The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts

16412

If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]

16409

Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]

16411

If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following

19269

'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]

19271

No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings

7305	Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]

19270

If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

11076

Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics

16410

Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]

19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language

11075

The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]