Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)' and 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]