Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Lewis's Programme' and 'The Varieties of Reference'

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8 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8432 Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]