13 ideas
| 12430 | Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher] |
| 12431 | I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
| 12429 | Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher] |
| 16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |