Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language', 'Reply to Second Objections' and 'Defeasibility Theory'

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14 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]