60 ideas
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |