Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Anti-essentialism' and 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
21544 It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539 Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21538 If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21534 The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
21540 Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
21536 When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
21535 Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
21533 Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
21537 I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
21532 Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
21542 Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
21541 The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]