29 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |