Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essence and Being', 'Parts of Classes' and 'Summa Theologicae'

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102 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas]
Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas]
Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas]
We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas]
Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas]
Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas]
Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas]
Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas]
Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas]
It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas]