Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essence and Being', 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas' and 'The Empirical Stance'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]