Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance', 'talk' and 'Empty Names'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

18935

Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

18945

Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18934

Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]

18938

Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

18947

Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

7295	Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

13965

Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

13964

Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]