Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'The Epistemology of Modality' and 'The Doctrine of Necessity Examined'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]