36 ideas
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |