39 ideas
| 13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
| 13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
| 9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
| 15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| 374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
| 13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
| 13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
| 389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
| 390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
| 392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
| 393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
| 385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
| 387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
| 373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
| 379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
| 371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
| 376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
| 382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
| 381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
| 386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
| 388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
| 377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
| 378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |