Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'Truth Rehabilitated' and 'Logological Fragments II'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
19588 The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
19598 Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
19586 Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
19587 Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
19597 Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]