Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'Abstract Objects'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
8915 How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
8917 The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
8912 Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
8913 Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
8914 Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
8916 Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8918 Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
8919 Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]