33 ideas
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
| 20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
| 6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| 7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
| 6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
| 22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
| 20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
| 20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
| 22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |