Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'Wang's Paradox' and 'Recent Work on Consciousness'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]