33 ideas
| 6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
| 6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
| 6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
| 6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
| 23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
| 6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
| 6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
| 6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| 6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| 17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
| 17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
| 17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
| 17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
| 17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
| 17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
| 17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
| 17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
| 17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
| 17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
| 17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
| 17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
| 6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| 6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| 6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |