Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory' and 'Mathematics without Numbers'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]