Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'Empty Names' and 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15663 Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20572 De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]