Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Language', 'Essay on a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' and 'Aristotle on Essence and Explanation'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]