15 ideas
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
| 2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |