181 ideas
| 7170 | 'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche] |
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 7167 | Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche] |
| 7196 | Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche] |
| 7137 | Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 7132 | Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
| 7188 | Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche] |
| 7145 | Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche] |
| 7144 | Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 7153 | We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 7174 | Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche] |
| 7175 | Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 7189 | Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche] |
| 7207 | Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 7161 | The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 7134 | Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 7186 | There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 7154 | We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 7146 | Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 7181 | Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche] |
| 7129 | Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche] |
| 7156 | Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 7149 | Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche] |
| 7169 | Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche] |
| 7182 | 'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche] |
| 7183 | 'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche] |
| 7133 | There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 7139 | Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 7131 | The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
| 7152 | With protoplasm ˝+˝=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche] |
| 7130 | Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche] |
| 7155 | Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche] |
| 7143 | Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 7157 | We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche] |
| 7148 | The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche] |
| 7138 | The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche] |
| 7135 | 'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche] |
| 7171 | Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 7209 | There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche] |
| 7194 | Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche] |
| 7136 | Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche] |
| 7163 | Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche] |
| 7147 | Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche] |
| 7190 | Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche] |
| 7201 | Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche] |
| 7205 | Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche] |
| 7141 | A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche] |
| 7168 | Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche] |
| 7159 | The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche] |
| 7197 | Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche] |
| 7165 | Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche] |
| 7193 | Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche] |
| 7191 | What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche] |
| 7151 | Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche] |
| 7185 | Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche] |
| 7164 | Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche] |
| 7198 | Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche] |
| 7150 | By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche] |
| 7177 | Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche] |
| 7172 | Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
| 7166 | Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche] |
| 7204 | The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche] |
| 7173 | Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche] |
| 7176 | 'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche] |
| 7195 | If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 7206 | Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche] |
| 7140 | Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche] |
| 7142 | All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 7180 | Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche] |
| 7179 | Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche] |
| 7178 | The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche] |
| 7192 | Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche] |
| 7158 | Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche] |
| 7199 | It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche] |
| 7162 | Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
| 7208 | Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche] |
| 7160 | Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche] |
| 7203 | In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche] |
| 7200 | A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche] |