15 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |