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All the ideas for 'Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed)', 'On What There Is' and 'Notebooks'

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert]