Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed)', 'Plural Quantification Exposed' and 'The Mystery of Consciousness'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
8920 Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
10779 A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10781 A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]