14 ideas
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |