32 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |