24 ideas
| 4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
| 18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
| 4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
| 4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
| 3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
| 4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
| 5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
| 21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
| 23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
| 18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
| 22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
| 18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
| 18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
| 18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
| 18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
| 18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
| 18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
| 18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
| 18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |