16 ideas
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |